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In Vitro Gametogenesis and the Creation of 
‘Designer Babies’
SEPPE SEGERS, GUIDO PENNINGS, WYBO DONDORP, GUIDO DE WERT, and  
HEIDI MERTES
Abstract: Research into the development of stem cell-derived (SCD) gametes in humans, 
otherwise known as in vitro gametogenesis (IVG), is largely motivated by reproductive 
aims. Especially, the goal of establishing genetic parenthood by means of SCD-gametes is 
considered an important aim. However, like other applications in the field of assisted repro-
duction, this technology evokes worries about the possibility of creating so-called ‘designer 
babies.’ In this paper, we investigate various ways in which SCD-gametes could be used to 
create such preference-matched offspring, and what this would mean for the acceptability 
of IVG, if it is premised that it is morally problematic to ‘design’ offspring. We argue that 
IVG might facilitate the creation of preference-matched offspring, but conclude that this 
should not undermine the moral acceptability of IVG altogether—even if one concedes 
the premise that creating ‘designer babies’ is morally problematic. In the light of this, we 
also point at a possible inconsistency for a position that condemns the creation of ‘designer 
offspring,’ while accepting the various endeavors to have genetically related offspring.
Keywords: in vitro gametogenesis; gamete derivation; artificial gametes; genetic parenthood; 
assisted reproduction; stem cells; gene editing; designer babies
Introduction
Several research groups are aiming to create stem cell-derived (SCD) gametes, 
a process also referred to as in vitro gametogenesis (IVG). This research is primarily 
aimed at reproductive applications. As such, it can be seen as one of the most 
recent steps in the direction of facilitating people who are unable to reproduce 
naturally to have genetically related offspring.
While the primary goal is to help couples or individuals obtain a healthy baby 
of their own, many applications in the field of infertility treatment evoke fears 
of a push toward the creation of so-called ‘designer babies’1—who are adapted to 
other preferences of the future parents than merely genetic relatedness. For 
instance, the company 23andMe has patented a computerized method of match-
ing the genotypic data of the gamete donor with that of the future parent, in order 
to increase the chance that the future child will have the traits the parents desire.2 
It has been said that the ultimate goal is to offer this service to any couple wishing 
to have a baby.3 This idea of parents-to-be ‘shopping’ for their future child’s char-
acteristics is ethically controversial, especially if it concerns non-disease–related traits. 
Also, cloning,4 preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)5 and genome-editing 
tools6 have been the subject of such fears, with regard to the creation of designer 
babies. In vitro maturation (IVM) of immature oocytes might feed similar worries, 
although it has, so far, not yet been a real subject of the designer babies debate. 
Yet, IVM could potentially make oocyte retrieval cheaper, faster and safer; which 
Acknowledgement: This study was funded by the Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology 
in Flanders (IWT), (project number: 150042).
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might significantly increase the number of available oocytes and thus facilitate 
selection and editing tools.7
Now the technology to produce SCD-gametes also feeds worries about the 
possibility to produce designer offspring.8,9 Relatively early in the debate about 
the ethics of IVG, Mathews et al. pointed at this potential and controversial use of 
SCD-gametes.10 More recently, researchers have warned that the SCD-gamete 
technology “may exacerbate concerns regarding human enhancement,” raising 
hard questions of where to draw the line “between alterations that end harmful 
conditions versus eugenics.”11 It is important to critically assess the likelihood of 
such scenarios. At present, much of this likelihood is premised upon further scien-
tific developments. For any of the scenarios we will discuss, scientific improve-
ments will have to be made, both in the field of stem cell research and in the field 
of genomics. The technology to produce SCD-gametes in humans is far from being 
an established clinical practice and still raises many safety concerns. To design 
babies, we still have much to learn about the genotype-phenotype-relationship, 
DNA sequencing and DNA interpretation. Moreover, the designing of complex 
traits is complicated by the involvement of many different genes, and even in case 
of less complex traits there is the difficulty that selection, or editing, of a certain 
desired trait might simultaneously cause other detrimental effects (so-called 
antagonistic pleiotropy).12,13 Still, it stands as an important question whether and 
how IVG could serve as a tool to create designer offspring and whether this would 
be a convincing reason to halt the development of this technique.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in the next section, we will clarify what 
we mean when we use the concept ‘designer babies.’ As this is a contested con-
cept, we will propose a working definition for the aims of this paper. We will then 
explore the various scenarios in which IVG could be used to create designer babies. 
In the subsequent section, we will argue that IVG is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary condition to design offspring. Still, IVG could facilitate the creation of 
designer babies, especially in combination with practices that are already more or 
less socially accepted. We then explore where such a possible facilitating role of 
IVG leaves us in terms of the moral acceptability of allowing the development of 
SCD-gametes. We suggest that, based on the principle of consistency, regulation 
rather than a ban would be an appropriate reaction to IVG, even if one condemns 
the creation of designer babies and fears a contributive role of IVG in this. Lastly, 
we conclude by pointing at a possible conflict between the wish for genetic parent-
hood and the creation of designer babies.
We will not argue for or against the moral acceptability of designing future off-
spring: such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper and is neither new, nor 
exclusive to the debate about IVG. For the sake of debate, we will explore what the 
possible role of SCD-gametes in creating designer children means for the moral 
acceptability of IVG, if it is held that it is morally problematic to design offspring.
‘Designing’ offspring
The idea of designing offspring is controversial, and also the meaning of ‘designer 
baby’ is contested.14 There is relative consensus about the idea that the creation of 
designer babies involves genetic interventions in order to influence the traits of 
future offspring, but this is vague, and it can be rightly asked which interventions 
and which traits one is talking about. For the purpose of this paper, we will define 
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the creation of designer offspring as genetic interventions by means of editing 
and/or selection techniques in order to create offspring with nondisease related 
traits which match the future parents’ preferences and which might, but need not 
be, eugenic.
A few words to clarify this demarcation. If taken literally, one does not design 
offspring if e.g. one selects embryos via PGD.15 Greely, for instance, distinguishes 
‘designer babies’ from ‘selected babies’ and reserves the former for germline inter-
ventions by means of genome editing methods like CRISPR/Cas9.16 However, 
since there are also people who do not discriminate between selection methods 
and direct gene editing in the context of the creation of designer babies17, we will 
discuss scenarios of how SCD-gametes might be used both to select and to edit in 
view of creating future children with desired traits.
As regards the purpose of these interventions, and thus the nature of the 
targeted traits, we will contrast disease related genetic interventions (e.g., tradi-
tional applications of PGD) from, on the one hand, genetic interventions aimed at 
enhancement (e.g., to improve general intelligence), and genetic interventions 
aimed at feature selection (e.g., to choose eye color) on the other hand. In contrast 
to the first category, we will consider the latter two categories as instances of the 
endeavor to create designer offspring. Much of the moral controversy surely has 
to do with the nonmedical, but even if one limits the discussion to this subset, it is 
also appropriate to distinguish nonmedical interventions aimed at enhancement, 
from nondisease related interventions that are not aimed at enhancement. This 
allows one to specify the relationship between the creation of designer babies and 
eugenics; we will assume that only the enhancement-variant would also be an 
instance of eugenics, as here, the aim is to have a child with improved characteristics. 
We acknowledge that there will likely be some overlap between these categories 
(e.g., genetic interventions to obtain athletically built offspring could be said to be 
in the grey area between eugenic and noneugenic creation of designer babies). 
This is, however, a conceptual issue that cannot be tackled within the confines of 
this paper. It could, moreover, be nuanced that ‘eugenics’ historically not only 
referred to creating ‘better babies,’ but also to “discouraging inferior members of 
society from having children.”18
Given this understanding of what it means to design offspring, we will now 
explore the relationship between this endeavor and IVG.
Selective breeding and ‘selected embryos’
‘In vitro eugenics’
A first possibility to use SCD-gametes to create offspring, with traits that match 
the would-be parents’ preferences, is Sparrow’s ‘in vitro eugenics’ (IVE) scenario.19 
IVE need not be used to breed “better babies”20, but could also serve as a tool to 
obtain offspring with specific traits matching individual parents’ preferences, 
either disease or nondisease related. The process holds that gametes are derived 
from embryonic stem cells (ESCs) and then recombined with other gametes. From 
these gametes, embryos are created from which ESCs are derived; to be differenti-
ated into gametes, and so on. Sparrow prefers the scenario where it is possible to 
start from induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) to produce gametes “by sourcing 
somatic cells from a large number of individuals with desired genetic traits and 
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then deriving stem cells and then gametes from these.”21 This process would enable 
embryo selection in a short time span by allowing “scientists to proceed forward 
to multiple generations of human beings ‘in vitro.’”22 Sparrow argues that this 
process of iteration could be used to shape the genome through selective breeding, 
by combining desired traits that arise in different embryos. This is not an instance 
of direct genome editing, but here one intentionally combines the SCD-gametes to 
obtain an embryo with the desired traits.
Apart from the scientific limits we described in the introduction, Sparrow 
acknowledges that there are additional barriers to IVE.23 IVE is troubled by the 
inherent creation and destruction of embryos which is considered immoral by 
many. This is, however, not exclusive to IVE: e.g., also in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
involves embryo destruction, and if it is accepted in that context, it will require 
additional moral reasons to prohibit it in the context of IVE. A different objection 
to IVE is that it might lead to the accumulation of epigenetic changes due to keep-
ing the many cell lines in vitro, which may impact the offspring’s health.24 Also, 
those people who would use IVE would need to sacrifice the strong genetic link 
with their children and it is unlikely that many people would be willing to do this 
for the sake of having a child with desired characteristics.25,26 Finally, IVE would 
be very time consuming and less powerful than the most recent genome editing 
technologies.27,28,29
Creation and selection of embryos created from SCD-gametes
Bourne et al.30 elaborated on a suggestion by Mathews et al.31 that IVG could be 
used to produce large numbers of gametes (especially oocytes—which might also 
become possible via IVM) and embryos in order to screen and select genetic traits, 
which would allow one “to select the best child possible.”32 The application which 
Bourne et al. describe focuses on enhancement, but again this need not be the case. 
One could produce large numbers of embryos via IVG and then select the embryo 
with the desired genotype (which would, again, raise the troubled issue of embryo 
destruction).33 Greely describes a similar scenario—which he calls ‘Easy PGD’ 
(‘easy’ because it avoids oocyte retrieval)—which combines the technology used 
to derive gametes “from a person’s skin cells” with PGD.34 Prospective parents 
will be offered genetic information on “say, a hundred embryos,” which would 
include information on their viability and risk of certain diseases as well as infor-
mation about sex, behavioral and aesthetic characteristics.35
Note, however, that due to the involvement of many gene variants in the expres-
sion of complex traits, and the interaction between the environment and the 
genome, the ability to predict phenotype from genotype will be limited, especially 
for complex traits like behavioral characteristics. In general, this scenario would, 
like IVE, be time consuming and less powerful than newer genome editing tech-
nologies. As no ‘better’ genes are ‘added,’ the choice about DNA variations in the 
future offspring would be restricted to those alleles of which the parents them-
selves are carriers.36
Also, much of this scenario’s potential depends on the possibility to overcome 
the limited number of oocytes collected per person. It should, however, be noted 
that if IVM would yield what it is expected to yield in the future—namely a sig-
nificantly increased number of available oocytes—then it may be more realistic to 
produce large amounts of oocytes via IVM rather than via IVG.37 After all, IVM 
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would require less manipulation than IVG. Moreover, if the short supply of oocytes 
could thus be remedied (either by IVG or IVM), this could also benefit other appli-
cations that are currently hindered by this shortage. It could, for instance, settle 
the deficit of donor eggs for reproductive purposes. In view of designing offspring, 
it could thus be made easier to create oocytes from persons with desired traits 
which could be made available via gamete banks. Also the technique of somatic 
cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) could thus be perfected, and might as well be used to 
create designer babies; it might be used to create children with the same genome 
as someone with the desired genotype.38,39 These scenarios would, however, not 
lead to shared genetic parenthood, and choices about the future child’s traits 
would, here too, be restricted to the initial genotype from which one starts, which 
could be overcome by direct genetic modification.
SCD-gametes and germline genome editing methods
Gene editing of preimplantation embryos seems to count as the paradigmatic way 
toward ‘tailor made’ offspring and the technological breakthrough of the CRISPR/
Cas9 method makes the possibility of editing the human germline easier than ever 
before.40 While some have warned about the adverse effects of off-target muta-
tions due to inefficient gene editing, this is probably a technical issue which can be 
resolved by ongoing improvements in efficiency and accuracy of the technique.41 
Still, germline gene editing of embryos is troubled by mosaicism in the edited 
embryos (i.e. the chance that not all cells will have the intended genetic change).42,43 
Alternatively, editing gametes is hindered in males by the makeup of the sperm 
cells, and in females by the low technical efficiency and the low number of mature 
oocytes collected per patient.44
The issue of the low number of mature oocytes collected per patient could 
be overcome in the future via IVG or IVM. These oocytes could then be directly 
edited, provided that the level of technical efficiency would be significantly 
improved. Thus, for this route to become possible, production of oocytes via IVG 
or IVM is required, and also further research into the efficiency and safety of the 
CRISPR/Cas9 system during meiosis.45 Alternatively, stem cells created from a 
person’s somatic cell (either through induced pluripotency or ESCs via SCNT), 
could be edited via CRISPR/Cas9 and then differentiated into gametes.46,47 This 
application is mostly referred to when the link is made between IVG and designer 
babies. It is said that genome editing is easier in stem cells than in gametes and 
embryos, although this route would possibly still hold risks associated with poten-
tial off-target mutations and antagonistic pleiotropy.48 Even if these issues could 
be overcome, and even if it would be possible to generate human SCD-gametes, 
most traits (including medical conditions such as cancer or heart disease) would 
still be difficult to target because of their multifactorial nature (but this is equally 
true for the previous scenarios).
IVG: neither sufficient nor necessary for designing offspring
In these scenarios, SCD-gametes can be used to create designer babies. Can this 
possibility justify a decision to halt the development of IVG, if it is held that 
designing future offspring is morally problematic? If one would consider banning 
IVG because it could lead to the creation of designer offspring, it will be 
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appropriate to ponder the causal status of IVG relative to this endeavor of creating 
designer offspring.
First, one could assert that a ban on IVG in order to avoid the creation of designer 
offspring would be disproportionate, since IVG is in itself not sufficient for the 
creation of ‘tailor made’ offspring. Each of the scenarios we discussed is premised 
upon further scientific developments; not only improvement of SCNT or the tech-
nique to generate iPSCs (at least if the genetic link to the parents is to be retained), 
but also improvement of genetic screening of embryos (broader: more thorough 
DNA sequencing and interpretation), and improvement of genome editing 
technologies.
Second, it could be argued that banning IVG in order to avoid the creation of 
designer babies would miss the mark, as IVG is not necessary to create designer 
offspring; there are ways to design offspring without IVG. If IVG would turn 
out not to be safe and/or if it would be outlawed, there would still be methods to 
select (e.g. PGD does not require IVG) and edit embryos with CRISPR/Cas9. PGD, 
for instance, is currently not (yet) used to select for traits such as height, hair or eye 
color, but there are centers that offer PGD for nondisease related sex selection.49,50 
Better genome sequencing and stronger ability to predict phenotype from geno-
type will probably expand the selection possibilities even further (even without 
IVG).51 Also, if IVM could be used to obtain a high numbers of oocytes, IVG would 
not even be necessary in the scenarios where selection and/or editing is premised 
upon the availability of (many) oocytes. One could furthermore point to the fact 
that in many countries, choosing a gamete donor, based on the traits the future 
parents want their child to have, is accepted and allowed (often higher prices are 
paid for gametes from donors with desired traits).52,53 This form of selection could 
also be considered as a way to create designer babies for which IVG is not a necessary 
condition either.
IVG: possible facilitator for designing offspring?
Even if IVG would neither be necessary, nor sufficient for the creation of designer 
babies, it could nevertheless be held that IVG could facilitate the possibility of 
designing offspring. Here, ‘facilitate’ is premised upon the assumption that gene 
editing technologies are not yet available, or that if they would be available, they 
would only be applicable on stem cells and not yet on embryos or gametes (see 
above). IVG would contribute by making oocyte production easier and making 
more gametes and embryos available from which to choose, and, in case of gene 
editing, it would circumvent the more difficult embryo or sperm route, in favor of 
editing stem cells instead, or avoiding oocyte retrieval.
One way to respond to this is that even if IVG could facilitate the creation of 
designer babies, this would still depend upon other steps. It would be possible in 
principle to halt before these next steps in combination with IVG are taken. So, it 
is one thing to allow derivation of gametes from stem cells for research purposes, 
it is another to use this technology for reproduction and it is yet another to 
combine this reproductive use with genetic selection, selective breeding or editing 
techniques for disease related traits. Applications for nondisease related traits 
would be yet another leap.
Yet, some nuance is appropriate here. First, it might be stated that allowing IVG 
could indeed facilitate a push toward accepting the creation of designer babies, if 
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there are prior social situations/institutions in which such a development is likely 
to get approval. We already indicated that it is, at present, quite accepted to choose 
a gamete donor based on his/her physical traits, hobbies, studies, etc., so one 
might argue that here we are only a small step away from accepting donor 
conceived ‘babies on demand.’ The widespread acceptance of donor selection to 
choose the future child’s traits might be feared as facilitating the acceptance of 
‘IVG-aided’ creation of designer offspring.54 Importantly, however, if selection in 
function of the child’s traits is accepted in this context, additional reasons will be 
needed to deny this acceptability in other contexts. Second, it is true that genome 
editing and selective breeding in the IVE-scenario would be additional steps 
(as well as reproductive cloning in the case where IVG would aid SCNT from per-
sons with desired traits), and that it is, in principle, possible to halt before these 
steps are taken. However, this reasoning does not really hold for the Easy PGD 
scenario. That is, Easy PGD differs from the other scenarios in the sense that the 
former is based on a practice that is already more or less accepted—traditional 
PGD has already been in use for several years and enjoys relative social approval 
for disease related traits. If it would be possible to create a large amount of embryos 
via IVG, this could overcome current practical limitations and increase the chances 
of selecting the ‘best’ embryo or the embryo with those traits which best match the 
future parents’ preferences. As such, it could be argued that Easy PGD would only 
be a continuation of a current practice that is at present still practically limited. So 
the argument that IVG would be a facilitator for the creation of designer babies is 
probably most poignant in the Easy PGD case.
Regulation, assumed benefits and the value of genetic relatedness
Where does this leave us in view of the moral acceptability of IVG? Would such 
a potential facilitating role of IVG justify a decision to halt the development of 
SCD-gametes, provided that one condemns the creation of designer babies? 
Reference to the case of traditional PGD might provide insight here. It is already 
possible to use PGD to select embryos for nondisease related traits, and such 
applications are actually already being done (viz., nondisease related sex selec-
tion55,56), but this has not led to a decision to ban PGD. Admittedly, much depends 
on how PGD is regulated, which exactly proves the point—despite the possibility 
to use PGD for nonmedical reasons, the reaction has not been that PGD has to be 
banned, but rather that it needs to be regulated. Among the reasons for regulating 
rather than banning PGD are the value of avoiding the transmission of genetic 
diseases and the value of reproductive autonomy.57
IVG seems to be similar to this case. If one condemns the creation of designer 
babies, and recognizes the potential share of IVG in facilitating this, one should 
balance this disadvantage against the potential benefits of IVG. The assumed ben-
efits of IVG include an increase in reproductive autonomy, and enabling genetic 
relatedness in parent-child relationships, which is highly valued by many. People 
who could satisfy their wish to have a child ‘of their own’ by means of IVG would 
be deprived of this possibility in case of a moratorium or ban on the creation of 
SCD-gametes. Sure enough, the value of genetic relatedness is also the reason why 
future parents use PGD, though it would be safer for the offspring to use donor 
gametes.58 This raises the question whether the importance of being genetically 
related to one’s children is sufficiently great to justify reproductive risk-taking.
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This latter question about the importance of genetic relatedness is key to two 
rather general challenges for those who oppose the creation of designer offspring, 
but accept the various endeavors to have genetically related offspring. First, 
various reasons have been suggested for preferring to have genetically related 
offspring, and one of them is the value of parent-child resemblance. It is dubious 
whether this wish, to have a child who looks like you, has enough normative force 
to give special moral weight to the preference of having genetically related chil-
dren, but the fact is that people give much attention to parent-child resemblance.59 
However, this value of resemblance is actually a wish for a child who shares some 
of the parents’ traits. It might thus be questioned that if genetic relatedness is 
pursued for this reason, how does this desire to reproduce some of one’s own 
characteristics in one’s child differ from other attempts to generate offspring with 
specific traits. It is similar to future parents who choose a gamete donor based on 
his/her characteristics because of their wish that their future child would also 
have these traits.60 Yet, it can be retorted that, in contrast to other ‘designer meth-
ods,’ these latter instances “still implicitly expresses a willingness to accept as a 
gift the product of a process we do not control.”61 Sandel, for instance, has argued 
that this sense of giftedness would be undermined by the creation of designer 
babies.62 This might, according to Sandel, reduce our sense of solidarity, viz. 
our sensitivity to the role of chance in life, which “makes us share risks and pool 
resources in the form of social insurance.”63 However, this argument is premised 
on the idea that if we choose traits, there is no reason to expect that the costs of 
having these traits should be shared. Yet, it has been argued that in many cases 
solidarity has more to do with respect for the value of persons than with whether 
or not this person is responsible for being in the situation (s)he is in.64 Moreover, 
in the case of designing future offspring one could hardly hold these children 
responsible, as they would not be the ones who chose their traits.
Second, and apart from the value of physical resemblance, it may be asked how 
and/or why the importance of being genetically related to one’s parents differs in 
a morally relevant sense from other wishes that parents-to-be might have vis-à-vis 
their future children’s characteristics. Indeed, most infertile couples do not just 
want a child, but want a genetically related child, which is a specific wish about 
the future child’s characteristics that is nevertheless widely accepted in the field 
of infertility treatment.65 ‘Genetically related’ and e.g. ‘gender’ or ‘eye color’ are 
all specifications for a ‘child,’ so why would the former be morally acceptable in 
contrast to preferences about other nondisease related traits? These are important 
questions that deserve due consideration, both in the discussion about the accept-
ability to create designer babies and in the debate about the moral importance of 
genetic relatedness in parent-child relationships.
Conclusion
It was our aim to spell out the possibilities of how SCD-gametes could potentially 
be used to create preference-matched offspring. We have set out the possible appli-
cations, showing that genetic interventions by means of selection or editing are 
neither inherent nor exclusive to the possibility of deriving gametes from stem 
cells. IVG might facilitate some of these interventions, but a moratorium or ban on 
the creation of SCD-gametes is neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid genetic 
interventions either by selection or editing. Moreover, this would undermine the 
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assumed main benefit of IVG, namely to establish genetic parenthood for those 
people who are unable to reproduce in a natural way. This value of genetic related-
ness is central to the field of infertility treatment and is highly valued by many 
people. However, we argued that this value also poses a challenge to the position 
which accepts the various endeavors to have genetically related offspring, while 
condemning the creation of designer offspring.
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